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HE FIRST AMMENDMENT of the U. S. Constitution states, “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”1 That sounds simple 
enough, but our high court and has spent more than 200 years and written 
countless opinions deciding what that means. The First Amendment, the Court has 
pronounced, protects the right to criticize political leaders, the right to burn the 
flag, and even the right not to speak, for example. 
However, the Supreme Court has never found that the First Amendment pro-
tects a right to distribute obscene materials—hardcore pornography. “[T]o equate 
the free and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploi-
tation of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment 
and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom. It is a ‘misuse of the great 
guarantees of free speech and . . . press.’”2 
The Court has indicated in its jurisprudence that such materials are harmful 
and that the distribution of obscene material is not a right necessary to civil soci-
ety.3  
Both federal and state laws prohibit distribution of obscene material and those 
who do distribute can be prosecuted. But what is “obscene material” or, rather, 
when is something “obscene” instead of merely “pornographic?” That is the key 
question in a prosecution. 
_______________________________ 
1 U.S. Const. amend. I 
2 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973). 
3 Paris Adult Theatre v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).  
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 Not all pornography is obscene and not all depictions of nudity or sexual activ-
ity is pornographic. Indeed, individual opinions on what constitutes pornography 
differ widely as do opinions on what constitutes obscene material.   
My definition for the term “pornography” is this: “Nudity or sex acts, erotically 
depicted, intended to excite.” That definition distinguishes a depiction in a medical 
textbook from one in Playboy magazine.   
In law, the depiction in Playboy may be no more obscene than that in the text-
book. Both may be “free speech” and thus protected. I acknowledge that this is 
confusing to many, but keep in mind, even the Supreme Court of the United States 
was confused through many decades of its jurisprudence, only settling on a work-
able definition of “obscenity” in 1973. 
One observation as we explore the topic: I would suggest that most pornogra-
phy distributed for consumption today—which is far from that depicted in Playboy 
over the years, and certainly distant from that in medical textbooks—could be 
found to be obscene in one or more jurisdictions in America.   
The Supreme Court has used a variety of legal standards, many of them con-
fusing, over decades to guide states and Congress in determining what material 
may be considered obscene and therefore the subject of a criminal prosecution. 
Finally, in 1973 the Court began to settle on a very understandable and effective 
standard in Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15. There, the Court reaffirmed that, “This 
much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unpro-
tected by the First Amendment.” This is true even for “consenting adults,” the 
Court said in a second obscenity case in the same year.4 
The U. S. Congress and nearly all 50 states have passed laws prohibiting distri-
bution of obscene materials. Why have they done so?  In Paris Adult Theatre v. 
Slaton, The Supreme Court provided wonderful insight into that question:  
The sum of experience . . . affords an ample basis for legislatures to con-
clude that a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to fam-
ily life, community welfare, and the development of human personality, 
can be debased and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex . . . . 
The States [and Congress] have the power to make a morally neutral judg-
ment that public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such ma-
terial, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, to endanger the 
public safety, or to jeopardize . . . the States’ “right . . . to maintain a decent 
society.”5 
How prescient! Today’s symposium details the injury to our communities, to 
public safety, and to our society caused by pornography. In fact, we are in the midst 
of a public health crisis caused by pornography, a crisis that could have been pre-
vented by the enforcement of obscenity laws and other measures that you will hear 
about today. 
This is how a judge or jury determines whether material is obscene, as set forth 
in a three-prong test set out in decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, first in 1973 in 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25, and then as clarified in Smith v. United 
_______________________________ 
4 Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, at 57-59 (1973). 
5 Ibid. 
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 States, 431 U.S. 291, 301-02, 309 (1977), and in Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-
01 (1987). 
Prong 1: Prurient interest – Whether the average person, applying contempo-
rary adult community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, ap-
peals to the prurient interest. That term refers to an erotic, lustful, lascivious, 
abnormal, unhealthy, degrading, shameful, or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or 
excretion. It need not be all of these to be “prurient.” It is sufficient, for example, 
that it appeals to a lustful interest. In fact, it does not have to actually “appeal” at 
all but, rather, the Court looks to what the material was intended to do by the pub-
lisher of the material. Was the depiction or film intended to appeal to a lustful in-
terest? The fact that a doctor may have lustful thoughts in review of a medical book 
is irrelevant. The intent or purpose of the material is legally critical, 413 U.S. at 26.6 
A pornographer is not saved from a conviction by noting that similar depictions to 
those that are the subjects of his works may be found in a gynecological study for 
the author of the study intends a scientific appeal rather than a prurient one. Thus, 
the test is not whether the viewer is aroused but whether the work is sexual exploi-
tation.  
Prong 2: Patently offensive – Whether the average person, applying contem-
porary adult community standards, would find that the work depicts or describes, 
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct (i.e., ultimate sexual acts, normal or 
perverted, actual or simulated; masturbation; excretory functions; lewd exhibition 
of the genitals; or sadomasochistic sexual abuse).  
This prong of Miller does not ask whether the materials are offensive in the 
context in which the materials are expected to be used. Defense attorneys always 
argue that the material was intended for a willing adult buyer to be used in the 
privacy of his home. That statement is legally irrelevant.   
Perhaps a more important question is whether the pornography in question 
should be shown on the city bus, in the window of a downtown porn shop, or on a 
television in your home during a coffee party. The answer is, of course, “No.” Why? 
Such depictions would be found offensive. 
It should also be noted that the acts depicted on the work may be normal sex 
acts. They need not be acts which some or even the majority would find in and of 
themselves offensive. It is the exploitation of the sex act or acts that counts.   
Thus, obscenity is not the portrayal of illegal sex acts but, rather, the illegal 
portrayal of sex acts, normal or perverted. It is, as the Court said in Paris, the injury 
to the community as a whole, the endangerment to public safety, or the jeopardy 
of the right to maintain a decent society that is the proper concern of legislatures 
expressed through obscenity laws. 
In contemporary society—in this Internet Age—we have all witnessed the in-
jury to communities, to our safety or that of our spouse or children, and to the 
society in which we live. 
Prong 3: Lacks serious value – A work must be lacking in serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value to be legally obscene. This is referred to as the 
“LAPS Test” and the inquiry here is whether the work “genuinely” has value. It is 
not sufficient for the pornographers to merely assert, as they always do, that the 
material is art and thus it has serious value. This is a question for the jury to decide 
_______________________________ 
6 See also: Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S.463, 471-74 (1966).   
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 and the prosecutor will help the jury probe the intent of the pornographer by 
demonstrating how the work was pandered—as art or as pornography. Often a 
reading of a film’s content description on the box cover will answer that question 
to the detriment of the defendant.  
For prongs 1 and 2, the inquiry is whether the mythical “average person” in the 
community would say the work appeals to the prurient interest and is patently of-
fensive. This is included in the test to prevent each individual juror from making 
the decision based on his or her own tastes or preferences. For prong 3, the inquiry 
is whether a “reasonable person” would find the work lacks serious value. 
Note that contemporary community standards play a significant role in the first 
two prongs of the Miller Test. This assures that the standards of New York City are 
not imposed on a community in Kansas, for example. A work may not be obscene 
in Manhattan but it does not then follow, according to Miller, that it is protected 
in your home town. In many obscenity prosecutions defendants argue that they 
should not be liable for knowing the community standards of each town to which 
they shipped material. The law, however, is settled on this point and the burden is 
on the pornographer to know the community standards or risk the legal conse-
quences. Nor is the law different for Internet distribution. Many suggest that in the 
Internet Age, there are no such things as community standards, as though we are 
one big community. The hope of those who make this argument is to do away with 
obscenity laws for Internet depictions. There is no support for this in the Supreme 
Court.7 
Justice Potter Stewart’s widely panned statement referring to obscenity, “. . . I 
know it when I see it,” is often quoted by those who wish to ridicule the notion that 
obscenity can be defined at all. In truth, most people know it when they see it, at 
least if we can trust the history of obscenity prosecutions where a jury is involved. 
Nearly all such cases have been won by the prosecution over the last four decades 
or so. The particular motion picture to which Justice Stewart was referring was a 
French film titled, Les Amants, or The Lovers, the subject of the case Jacobellis v. 
Ohio 378 U. S. 184, (1964) which involved adultery with only one depiction involv-
ing sex, and apparently, that was mild. Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion 
that the film in question was not obscene commented on the difficulty that the 
Court has had in defining “obscenity" and concluded, “But I know it when I see it, 
and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.” 
I submit that if you find yourself on a jury in a federal obscenity trial where the 
hardcore pornography film involved is played in open court, you, like nearly 100% 
of all jurors who have gone before you, will know obscenity when you see it. Inci-
dentally, the last federal adult obscenity trial took place in Los Angeles in 2012. It 
was a carry-over case from the Bush Administration, delayed in going to trial due 
to the conduct of the judge assigned. Prominent pornographer Ira Isaacs was con-
_______________________________ 
7 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002), where the High Court reversed the Third Circuit con-
cluding that obscenity laws are not unconstitutional as applied to the Internet solely because ob-
scenity laws require application of community standards.  See also, United States v. Thomas, 74 
F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 820 (1996) (defendants operated a computer bul-
letin board system (BBS) from their home in California and were successfully prosecuted in Ten-
nessee despite claims that community standards should not apply). The lesson to be learned is 
that if you are not sure of community standards where you distribute, whether by UPS or Inter-
net, then don’t distribute.  
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 victed by a jury and received a 48-month sentence for distribution of obscene ma-
terial. His conviction was upheld by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. I 
believe that if you can win an obscenity case in L.A., you can win anywhere. 
Federal obscenity laws prohibit distribution of obscene material through the 
mails, by common carrier, via the Internet, and on cable or satellite TV (including 
hotel/motel porn). Most every state has a workable law prohibiting retail distribu-
tion of obscene pornography as well.8  
There are many sound reasons why obscenity laws should be enforced. Here 
are three. First, the law is a great teacher. Don’t we want our youth to grow up 
understanding that the sexual exploitation of another human being is bad? Second, 
enforcement of obscenity laws causes pornographers to self-regulate. When an ob-
scenity conviction is rendered by a jury, pornography distributors look to the na-
ture of the material that was the subject of the conviction and halt distribution of 
similar material. In the 1990s, pornography defense attorney Paul Cambria pub-
lished to porn producers and distributors a list of sex acts that should not be por-
trayed in porn films, including forced sex, rape, incest, depictions of pain, etc. Por-
nographers also withhold their material from geographical locations where convic-
tions are rendered, understanding that an obscenity conviction is an indication of 
prevailing community standards. Third, if the Department of Justice refuses to 
prosecute then the community standard becomes, “anything goes.” The porn in-
dustry understands this and will distribute any material, including the most ex-
treme, into all areas. 
Enforcement of obscenity laws is a critical part of the overall strategy to halt 
the public health crisis of pornography and to curbing all sexual exploitation. 
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8 For a list of federal and state laws, see http://endsexualexploitation.org/woip. 
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